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Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) networks for smart sensor nodes in the next 
generation of smart wireless sensing systems require a distributed security scheme to 
prevent the passive (eavesdropping) or active (jamming and interference) attacks from 
untrusted sensor nodes. This paper concerns advancing the security of the IoT system 
to address their vulnerability to being attacked or compromised by advancement of 
future supercomputers. In this work a novel embedded architecture has been designed 
and implemented for distributed IoT network that utilizes a master-slave full duplex 
communication to exchange the random and continuous modulated phase shift as the 
secret key to be used in higher-layer encryptions. In the proposed architecture, each IoT 
node generates a phase modulated random key/data and transmits it to a master node in 
the presence of an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve. The master node, simultaneously, 
broadcasts a high power signal using an omni-directional antenna, which is received as 
interference by Eve. This interference masks the generated key by the IoT node and will 
result in a higher bit-error rate in the data received by Eve. The two legitimate intended 
nodes communicate in a full-duplex manner and, consequently, subtract their 
transmitted signals, as a known reference, from the received signal (self-interference 
cancellation). We compare our proposed method with a conventional approach to 
physical layer security based on directional antennas. In particular, we show, using 
theoretical and measurement results, that our proposed approach provides significantly 
better security measures, in terms bit error rate (BER) at Eve’s location. Also, it is 
proven that in our novel system, the possible eavesdropping region, defined by the 
region with BER < 10-1, is always smaller than the reliable communication region with 
BER < 10-3.  It has been also shown that the security region enhanced significantly 
(SF<1) in the proposed technique compared to the conventional directional 
antenna/beam former techniques. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Providing security is a major issue in wireless networks due to their broadcasting nature and 
the resulting vulnerabilities to eavesdropping attacks. Security is often guaranteed in the higher 
layers of the network architecture using cryptographic protocols. Such protocols require a secure 
and random key sequence shared between the authenticated nodes a priori [1], [2]. In contrast, 
physical layer security methods are keyless and they can be used to securely share random keys to 
complement the conventional cryptographic techniques [2]. Furthermore, it is well-known that any 
encryption scheme can be deciphered given a sufficient amount of time and super-computational 
power. Hence, it is highly desirable to regularly and securely update the shared key in wireless 
nodes in order to minimize the chances of successful eavesdropping attacks [2], [3]. 
One previous work for implementing physical layer security is to employ directional antennas 
that transmit signal using a narrow beam [4]‒[6], see Fig. 1(a). To resolve the problem of 
information leakage in side-lobes a directional modulation technique [5], [6] has been proposed to 
distort the signal at side-lobes. However, this requires knowledge of the location of the receiver 
by the transmitter. Furthermore, it has been shown that an eavesdropper, for instance, a small 
antenna in the main lobe or reflector can detect the signal in the main lobe without degrading the 
received signal by the intended receiver [7]. 
In this work, we propose a novel technique to implement physical layer security in the front 
end. Our approach provides security by broadcasting an intentional interference in a full-duplex 
scenario that blocks Eve from obtaining the securely generated key, Fig. 1(b). Our protocol does 
not require any knowledge of the node locations. Also, the proposed architecture does not require 
directive antennas and only requires omni-directional antennas. We will show that it provides a 
higher security region ratio compared to previous work such as directional antenna approaches. 
 In Section II we describe the proposed physical layer security technique. Section III provides 
the system implementation and the measurement results of this work are presented in Section IV. 
The paper is concluded in Section V. 
II. MASTER-SLAVE FULL DUPLEX SECURITY TECHNIQUE 
A. Proposed Security Protocol (BER Point of View) 
In wireless networks the reliability of communication is often measured in terms of the bit error 
rate (BER) of the channel. Typically, when BER < 10-3, the communication is considered to be 
reliable. The security level at an unintended receiver Eve is also often measured using the bit error 
rate. Typically, when BER > 10-1 at Eve the communication is considered secure [6]. For instance 
with BER > 10-1 at Eve and assuming a key of length 100, the probability that Eve gets the entire 
key error-free is 2.7×10-5. 
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(a)                                                (b) 
Fig. 1.  Conceptual block diagrams of physical layer security approaches. 
(a) Using directional antenna. (b) The proposed security technique with a master source as 
interference and an IoT node as secured data transmitter. 
In general, in a phase-based modulation, such as a M-ary phase shift keying (M-PSK), bit error 
rate can be approximated as   
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 1
𝑘𝑘
. 2𝑄𝑄 �√2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 sin �𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏
𝑀𝑀
��                    (1) 
where 𝑀𝑀 = 2𝑘𝑘 is the constellation size, 𝑄𝑄(𝑥𝑥) is the Gaussian complementary error function, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 
is signal to interference- noise ratio and 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 is the absolute maximum phase shift range of the 
modulated data, e.g., 180˚ for conventional PSK. Then (1) implies that BER increases by reducing 
the maximum phase shift range 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 or by increasing the constellation size.  
In our proposed approach, we intentionally reduce the maximum phase shift range at Eve’s 
receiver by broadcasting a high power interference from the master node. Note that Eve receives 
the spatial summation of the transmitted power by the IoT node and the master node. Then, as 
illustrated in Fig. 2(a), the maximum phase shift range at Eve occurs when, in the two-dimensional 
plane, the summation vector is orthogonal to the randomly phase-modulated signal received from 
the IoT node. Therefore, the maximum phase shift 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 at Eve is 
𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = arcsin�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸� = arcsin(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)           (2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 are the received power at Eve from the IoT node as the desired secret 
key and master node as interference, respectively. The ratio of the two is actually the signal to 
interference ratio at Eve, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸.  
Note also that in our approach the phase shift generated by the IoT node is not necessarily 
constrained by 𝜋𝜋/𝑀𝑀 as in the conventional M-PSK modulations. Instead, the generated phase shift 
is continuous and random. Then, the maximum phase shift range is split into 𝑀𝑀 regions, each of 
them corresponding to a key/data in a gray coding format.  For example for 𝑀𝑀 = 4, as illustrated 
in Fig. 2(b), the phase shift regions of (–𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏<𝜑𝜑<–𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 /2), (–𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏/2<𝜑𝜑<0), (0 <𝜑𝜑<𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏/2), and   
(𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏/2<𝜑𝜑<𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏) corresponds to 00, 01, 11 and 10 key sequences, respectively.  
In Fig. 2(c), the BER at Eve is shown for different values of 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏  at Eve. It can be observed that 
the SIR or SNR range that satisfy the security condition (BER > 10-1 at Eve) is improved by 10 dB 
with 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 45° comparing to a traditional 𝑀𝑀-PSK with  𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 180°. 
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Fig. 2.  Proposed technique protocol, (a) interference effect on the 
maximum phase shift range, 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏. (b) Conceptual block diagram of 
key generation protocol, (c) BER versus SINR under various phase 
shift range, 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏. 
 
B. Comparisons between Security Techniques 
Let 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 be the transmitted power by the IoT node, 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 the transmitted power from the master node as 
undesired interference at Eve (which is proposed in our approach), 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 the overall noise power 
at Eve, 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 the channel gain between the IoT node and Eve, and 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 the channel gain between the 
master node and Eve. The channel gain for the directional antenna approach is given by 
𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 =  �𝜆𝜆 4𝜋𝜋� �2𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠(𝜃𝜃)𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 1 𝑟𝑟2�                       (3) 
where 𝜆𝜆 is the wavelength, 𝑟𝑟 is the distance of Eve to IoT source, 𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is Eve’s antenna gain, 
assuming an omni-antenna for Eve, and 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠(𝜃𝜃) is the antenna directive gain. The same equation (3) 
can be used for 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 and 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 in our approach with 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠(𝜃𝜃) = 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠. 
For the directional antenna scheme, there is no interference and the 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 is equal to 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁
= 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁                                  (4) 
In our proposed approach 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 at Eve can be written as:  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼@𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸                                  (5) 
Here, the noise power is negligible comparing to the interference power from the master. Using 
revised (3), (5) can be rewritten as     
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆/𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 . (𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼/𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆)2                        (6) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 and 𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼 are the distance between Eve and IoT as source and master as interference, 
respectively, Fig. 1 (b). The 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆 and 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 are the normalized antenna gains of the IoT node and the 
master node, which are omni-directional and can be assumed as identical, respectively. 
In order to take into account the condition for reliable communication in our comparison, we 
define the integrated area regions for both the reliability and security. Let 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 be the 
eavesdropping region, where BER < 10-1 for an Eve node in this region. Similarly, the reliable 
 
IoT
Eve
Intended 
Receiver
  
(a)                                                (b) 
10-1 100 101
(PI /PS)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2.2
2.7
3.2
3.7
4.2
4.7
SF
 fo
r D
ire
ct
io
na
l
SF
 fo
r P
ro
po
se
d 
A
pp
ro
ac
h
 
(c) 
Fig. 3.  Reliability and security comparison: (a) directional 
antenna, (b) proposed approach, (c) security factor comparison. 
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communication region 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the region of all locations for the intended receiver with BER 
< 10-3. Then the security factor 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 is defined as the ratio of areas of these two regions as  𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 < 10−1)
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 < 10−3)                           (7) 
The security factor SF can be used for a fair comparison between different physical layer security 
techniques. More specifically, given a protocol, a smaller value of 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 indicates a higher level of 
security, in terms of the covered area.  
Next, we compute the areas of eavesdropping region, Sa-Eve, and communication region, 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, for the directional antenna technique and our proposed technique. In the directional 
antenna approach, the area of region can be expressed as (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑/2)𝑟𝑟2, where r is the maximum 
distance of Eve from the IoT node for a specific probability of error and 𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑 is the directivity angle  
 
of IoT antenna. As shown in Fig. 2(c), the constraints (BER < 10-1) and (BER < 10-3) correspond 
to 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 of 10 dB and 15 dB, respectively. Therefore, by (3) and (4), the maximum distance is 
given by 
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ≤ ��
𝜆𝜆4𝜋𝜋�2 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠(𝜃𝜃)𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁                                     (8) 
Assuming both intended receiver and Eve has same 𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟 and 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁, for communication and the 
eavesdropping area, the 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 ratio of directional antenna technique can be given in terms of SNR 
as: 
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 10−3)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 10−1) ≈ 1015𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑101010𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑10 ≈ 3.2        (9) 
Therefore, for the directional antenna scheme, the eavesdropping region is always larger than 
the reliable communication region, which is shown in Fig. 3(a).  
In our proposed technique, 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the region where the following condition is satisfied 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(6)
�
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Fig. 4.  Block diagram of the proposed system. 
where 𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼/𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 is the ratio between Eve’s distance to the master (interference) and the slave (data 
source) nodes and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the SIR at which BER of Eve is 10-1. Let 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟= �(𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆⁄ )𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . 
Then the geometrical representation of 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 described by (10), illustrated in Fig. 3(b), is a circle 
centered at 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 and with radius 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 considering the data source node as reference of coordinate 
system        𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 = � 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟2 − 1� 𝑑𝑑  ,𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = � 1𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟2 − 1 � 𝑑𝑑               (11) 
Note that for 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 ≫ 1 the eavesdropper region is near the IoT node with radius of  𝑑𝑑/𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 ≪ 1.  
For the reliability condition, i.e., (BER < 10-3) at the master node, as intended receiver, self-
interference cancellation by the master node is the dominating factor. Note that 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵@𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼                                     (12) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 is the self-interference cancellation at master node and 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆  is the channel gain as 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =
�
𝜆𝜆
4𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
2
𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼. For a SIR of 15 dB, 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 of 10 and 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚  of 50 dB, the maximum reliable 
communication distance, 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, of the proposed protocol will be around 1 meter. This can be 
further improved under enhancement of self-interference rejection. Given the computed radius of 
the eavesdropping region stated in (11) and the maximum reliable communication distance 
between the two nodes, 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, the security factor for our proposed technique is 
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = � 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟2�2 ≈ 1𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟2 = 1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 .         (13) 
Therefore the security factor of our proposed approach is smaller than 1 under the master slave 
condition where (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆⁄ ≫ 1). In Fig. 3(c) the security factor of the directional antenna scheme and 
our proposed approach is shown. It can be observed that our proposed approach is more secure 
comparing to the directional approach as the eavesdropping region is always smaller than the 
reliable communication region 
III. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
The block diagram of the proposed system operating at 2.4 GHz is shown in Fig. 4. For the full 
duplex implementation, two identical omni-directional antennas, 𝜆𝜆 distance apart, are deployed for 
both Tx and Rx. A vector modulator (HMC631) is used as phase shifter and attenuator for RF self-
interference cancellation on both ends, providing more than 50 dB rejection. 
In order to have a variable power-interference ratio (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆) between the master and the slave, a 
variable gain amplifier (VGA) (ADL5246) is deployed. The maximum output power by transmitter 
              
(a)                                           (b) 
Fig. 5.  (a) Board layout of proposed system. (b) Measurement setup. 
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at the master node varies between -10 dBm and 10 dBm, while it varies at a lower level, between 
-10 dBm and 0 dBm, at the slave/IoT side. For the Rx path, the master node uses an LNA (PMA-
33GLN+) to amplify the received data and to drive the IQ mixer (HMC8193). The reference LO 
port of the IQ mixer is also driven by a coupled power of master source. Using a DC low pass filter 
(LPF) (LFCN-160+) the modulated code phase shift can be extracted as arctan(𝑆𝑆/𝑄𝑄). The passive 
eavesdropper also employs the same IQ mixer with a separate LO reference to extract the phase-
modulated key.  
In order to randomly generate the key a continuous and random phase shift is generated at the 
IoT node. A vector modulator (HMC631) is used to generate a continuous 360 degree phase shift 
with variable insertion loss (-51‒ -11 dB). An injection locked oscillator is an alternative candidate 
for the proposed system to generate the continuous phase shift, which also enables locking and 
synchronizing the frequency to the master source. In that case, an LNA can be inserted at the IoT 
node to amplify the received power from the master source by the injection-locked oscillator for 
frequency-synchronization [8]. This would also serve as the random phase modulator. This could 
be a future path of this work together with an IC implementation level. 
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Fig. 6.  (a) Measured self-interference rejection at master node. 
(b) Received phase shift dynamics versus generated phase shift 
from IoT at master and Eve at 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑑𝑑/2 with different ratio of 
master-IoT power. 
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Fig. 7.  BER measurement for different Eve location to IoT for 
𝑀𝑀 = 4. (a) 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 10 and (b) 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 1. 
IV. MEASUREMENT RESULT 
The board is fabricated on FR4 and its layout is shown in Fig. 5(a), which has 8x8cm size. The 
measurement setup is also shown in Fig. 5(b). The self-interference rejection performance of the 
master can be tuned from 35 dB to 45 dB rejection, which sets the maximum reliable link distance 
around 1m, as shown in Fig. 6(a). The maximum received phase shift at the master node while the 
phase shift at IOT node is continuously varied from 0 to 90° is shown in Fig. 6(b).  The maximum 
received phase shift at Eve at a distance 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑑𝑑/2 from both the master and the IoT node are also 
shown in Fig. 6(b), for different power ratios, 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆, of 10, 20 and 1. As expected, a larger power 
ratio of interference significantly reduces the maximum received phase shift. 
      For measuring the calculated security region, i.e., the radius of the reliable eavesdropping 
region with BER < 10%, the Eve antenna was located at different distances from the two nodes, 
including 𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼  > 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 > 𝑑𝑑. The results are shown in Fig. 7(a) and (b) for two different 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 of 
10 and 1, respectively. It can be observed that there is a small distance ratio at which Eve can have 
a BER smaller than 10% in order to violate the security condition. The distance is equivalent to 
the radius of the Eve’s circle explained in the previous section. This distance is below 
0.05d for 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 of 10 and 0.25𝑑𝑑 for 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 of 1. The measured results of this distance are close to 
the theoretically computed values presented in (11), which are 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 = 0.1𝑑𝑑 for 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 of 10 and 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 
= 0.3𝑑𝑑 for 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼/𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 of 1. 
 
    
V. CONCLUSION 
In this work we present a novel technique for physical layer security in the Internet-of-Things 
(IoT) networks. The proposed architecture uses a master-slave full duplex communication to 
exchange the modulated random and continuous phase shift as secret key to be used in higher-
layer encryptions. As the communication is full duplex the master node can cancel out its self-
interference leakage and extract the code transmitted by the IoT. However, this interference will 
distort the Eve’s antenna, preventing it from obtaining an acceptable estimate of the phase shift 
generated at the IoT.  
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